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Chapter 5
Financial Distress among the Elderly:
Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Crisis
Wenli Li and Michelle J. White

Bankruptcy ﬁlings by the elderly have increased dramatically as a proportion
of ﬁlings overall: data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project show that the
percent of all bankruptcy ﬁlings that are by the elderly increased six-fold
over the past 25 years, from just 2 percent in 1991 to 12 percent in 2013–16
(Thorne et al. 2018). Our ﬁgures, based on a much larger sample but
covering a shorter time period, show a doubling in the percent of ﬁlings
by the elderly since 2000, from 6 percent in 2000 to 12 percent in 2018.1
Some of the increase in bankruptcy ﬁlings by the elderly is simply due to
aging of the US population, but the share of the elderly in the US population only increased by 19 percent over the period 2000–18—much less than
the rate of increase in the elderly share of bankruptcies.2 Thus the data
suggest that there has been a disproportionate increase in ﬁnancial distress
of the elderly relative to the overall US population.
Foreclosures are also a sign of severe ﬁnancial distress for homeowners.
Although it is initiated by lenders rather than debtors, they generally occur
when homeowners in ﬁnancial distress cannot afford their mortgage payments (Fay, Hurst, and White 2002). Our data show that the share of the
elderly in foreclosures also increased rapidly, from 6.8 percent in 2000 to 11
percent in 2018, for an increase of nearly two-thirds.3 This rise again suggests a disproportionate increase in ﬁnancial distress of the elderly.
This chapter examines the question of whether and why ﬁnancial distress
has increased among the elderly relative to the general population. We
focus on both bankruptcy ﬁlings and foreclosure starts as dual indicators
of severe ﬁnancial distress. In particular, we examine whether two events
that occurred during the period can explain the increase in elderly ﬁnancial
distress: the 2005 bankruptcy reform and the ﬁnancial crisis that started in
2008. The 2005 bankruptcy reform discouraged all debtors from ﬁling for
bankruptcy by raising the costs of ﬁling and particularly discouraged debtors
with above-median household incomes from ﬁling by adding additional
obstacles.4 These changes made debtors worse off in general because discharge of debt in bankruptcy became less available. It also increased
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foreclosures because ﬁling for bankruptcy previously helped homeowners in
ﬁnancial distress save their homes by discharging non-mortgage debt (see
Li, White, and Zhu 2011; White and Zhu 2010). Similarly, the ﬁnancial crisis
that started in 2008 increased ﬁnancial distress because many workers lost
their jobs, leading to increases in both bankruptcy ﬁlings and foreclosures.
Home prices also fell sharply, causing additional foreclosures because some
homeowners chose to walk away from homes with underwater mortgages.
But whether bankruptcy reform and the ﬁnancial crisis had stronger negative effects on the elderly than younger age groups is an open question. We
examine whether and how both events affected bankruptcy ﬁlings and
foreclosure starts of the elderly relative to the general population.

Bankruptcy Filings and Foreclosure Starts
by the Elderly: New Evidence
Our data are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer
Credit Panel/Equifax Data (CCP), which is based on a 5 percent sample of
US individuals who have Equifax credit reports.5 We take a random sample
of 5 percent of individuals in the CCP, so that our dataset is a random
sample of 0.25 percent of all individuals with credit reports. These data are
reported quarterly and provide information concerning individuals’ debts,
Equifax Risk Scores, age, and location at the zipcode level.6 We also know
each quarter whether an individual ﬁled for bankruptcy or if lenders started
foreclosure.7 We drop individuals from the sample in the quarter following a
bankruptcy ﬁling when we examine bankruptcy ﬁlings, and we drop individuals from the sample in the quarter following the start of foreclosure
when we examine foreclosure starts. Thus only the ﬁrst bankruptcy ﬁling or
foreclosure start is considered. In what follows, we deﬁne the older population as persons age 65–85, versus the total population as those age 20–85.
Individuals younger than age 20 or older than 85 are dropped.8
Figure 5.1 shows bankruptcy ﬁlings and foreclosure starts of the elderly as
a proportion of the total population from 2000 to 2018. Here we see that the
elderly shares of bankruptcies and foreclosures are closely correlated, especially from 2000 to 2011, but they tended to diverge after 2012. The elderly
share of foreclosures peaked in 2012 and has declined since, while the
elderly share of bankruptcies continued rising up to 2017.
Next we evaluate whether rising debt levels explain the increase in ﬁnancial distress in the older population. As a comparison group, we use all
individuals age 45–64 which we refer to here as the ‘near-elderly;’ these
people are a useful comparison set because their ﬁnancial situations are
closest to that of the elderly. Like the elderly, the near-elderly tend to have
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Figure 5.1 Elderly share of bankruptcy ﬁlings and foreclosure starts
Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.
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Figure 5.2 Bankcard and mortgage debt of the elderly (65–85) relative to the nearelderly (45–64)
Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.

declining debt levels over time, while younger individuals’ debt levels tend
to increase over time.
Figure 5.2 shows average bankcard (credit plus debit card) debt and
average mortgage (ﬁrst mortgage plus home equity loans) debt of the
elderly, relative to the near-elderly. Bankcard debt levels of the elderly
relative to the near-elderly increased from 50 percent in 2000 to 66 percent
in 2018, or by one-third. This reﬂects the fact that the near-elderly reduced
their bankcard debt levels over the period, while the elderly did not. Mortgage debt ﬁgures are based on averages for all individuals, including nonhomeowners who do not have mortgages or home equity loans. Mortgage
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debt levels of the elderly relative to the near-elderly increased even faster
than bankcard debt levels over the period, rising from 50 percent in 2000 to
78 percent in 2018, or by more than half. Thus the relative increase in debt
levels of the elderly are likely to be an important factor in explaining the
increase in elderly ﬁnancial distress. Also the rise in the proportion of
bankruptcy ﬁlings and foreclosure starts of the elderly was larger than the
rise in relative debt levels of the elderly, suggesting that marginal increases
in debt led to large increases in elderly ﬁnancial distress.
Overall, these ﬁgures suggest that there has been an increase in ﬁnancial
distress of the elderly relative to the non-elderly population, since 2000. In
the next two sections, we examine two possible causes of the increase in
elderly ﬁnancial distress—the bankruptcy reform of 2005 and the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2008—and we test whether and to what extent they can explain the
increase.

Legal Background and Hypotheses
Before 2005, US bankruptcy law was very favorable to debtors: all debtors
were allowed to ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 under which all of their
unsecured debts could be discharged. Debts that could be discharged in
bankruptcy included credit card debts, unsecured installment debts, medical debts, past due rent and utility bills, and student loans. (Secured debts
such as car loans could not be discharged in bankruptcy unless the debtor
gave up the collateral securing the loan.) Future income was entirely
exempt from the obligation to repay, and debtors were only required to
repay from assets if their assets exceeded an exemption level set by their
state of residence. States have varying exemption levels for assets, ranging
from very low to unlimited for equity in owner-occupied homes. In states
such as Florida and Texas that have unlimited exemptions for equity in
owner-occupied homes, debtors who were homeowners could beneﬁt ﬁnancially from ﬁling for bankruptcy even if they had both high incomes and
high assets. Prior to 2005, a high fraction of US households could gain
ﬁnancially from ﬁling for bankruptcy.9
There was also a separate bankruptcy procedure, Chapter 13, under
which debtors could propose a plan to repay part of their debt from future
earnings over three to ﬁve years. Before 2005, debtors had the right to
choose between ﬁling under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, and they were not
obliged to repay more in Chapter 13 than the value of assets they would be
obliged to give up in Chapter 7. Accordingly, most debtors could ﬁle under
Chapter 13 and propose a plan to repay only a token amount of debt, since
they were not obliged to repay anything in Chapter 7. Chapter 13 also
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allowed some types of debts that were not dischargeable in Chapter 7—such
as unpaid taxes—to be discharged or repaid over time under the plan.
Filing for bankruptcy prior to 2005 also could help debtors who were
homeowners avoid foreclosure. Filing under Chapter 7 indirectly helped
debtors keep their homes, because having unsecured debt discharged
increased their ability to make their mortgage payments. Filing under
Chapter 13 helped debtors more directly, both because unsecured debt
was discharged and because debtors could stop foreclosure and spread out
repayment of mortgage arrears over the period of their repayment plans. In
addition, second mortgages could be discharged in Chapter 13 if they were
completely underwater. Filing under Chapter 13 also helped debtors avoid
repossession of their cars and underwater car loans could be reduced to the
market value of the car.10
The 2005 bankruptcy reform made bankruptcy much less favorable to
debtors in general. First, the blanket exemption of future income from the
obligation to repay was abolished for debtors with family incomes above the
median level in their states. These debtors are now obliged to take a ‘means
test’ that determines whether they must ﬁle under Chapter 13 and, if so,
provides a formula that determines how much of their future income must
be used to repay. The formula is based on Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
procedures for collecting from delinquent taxpayers, although additional
expenses are allowed. The adoption of the means test thus reduced the gain
from ﬁling for bankruptcy for debtors who had above-median income levels.
Second, the costs of ﬁling for bankruptcy rose, because lawyers’ fees
increased and because the reform imposed new requirements on debtors
to pay for and take credit counselling and debt management courses. These
changes discouraged many debtors from ﬁling even if they had belowmedian income levels.11 Third, bankruptcy reform made some types of
debts non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. Student loans were no longer discharged and car loans could no longer be reduced in bankruptcy to the
market value of the vehicle.12
These 2005 changes resulted in bankruptcy becoming both less beneﬁcial
to debtors in general, and less useful as a means for debtors to save their
homes. As a result, we predict both a fall in bankruptcy ﬁling rates, and a rise
in foreclosure rates following bankruptcy reform. Of most interest in this
chapter is how these predictions differ for the elderly relative to the nonelderly, which depends on the net effect of a number of changes made by
bankruptcy reform. Average levels of debt of all types tend to decline rapidly
with age, starting around age 45. This means that elderly debtors gain less
than the non-elderly from ﬁling for bankruptcy and, as a result, are predicted to be harmed less by bankruptcy reform. In addition, income from
Social Security is not counted in the means test that determines whether
debtors must ﬁle under Chapter 13. Because only the elderly have social
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security beneﬁts, this also means that they were harmed less than the nonelderly by bankruptcy reform: they are more likely to still qualify for
Chapter 7. Finally, a uniform new asset exemption of $1 million for retirement accounts such as 401(k) plans was instituted under the 2005 bankruptcy reform. Because the older population tends to have the largest
amount of assets in retirement accounts, this new exemption made bankruptcy more attractive for the elderly relative to the non-elderly. Yet many
states already had high exemptions for retirement assets in bankruptcy, so
that few elderly individuals had enough assets in retirement accounts to be
affected by the adoption of the new Federal exemption. As a result, other
factors would be predicted to be more important. Overall, the 2005 bankruptcy reform can be predicted to have caused a smaller drop in bankruptcy
ﬁlings by the elderly compared to the non-elderly, which means that the
proportion of elderly bankruptcy ﬁlers would be predicted to have increased
after 2005.
Next we explore how foreclosure rates by the elderly versus the nonelderly might be predicted to respond to the bankruptcy reform. Because
homeowners use bankruptcy to avoid foreclosure and bankruptcy became
less attractive after the reform, we predict a rise in foreclosure rates after
2005 for both the elderly and the non-elderly. Yet as discussed above, the
elderly have less mortgage debt on average than the non-elderly, and the
reform discouraged them from ﬁling less than it discouraged the nonelderly. Both of these factors imply that the foreclosure rate for the elderly
would be predicted to rise by less than that of the non-elderly following the
2005 reform.13
Finally, we turn to the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis. Personal bankruptcy
ﬁlings fell sharply after the 2005 bankruptcy reform—from 2 million in 2005
to 775,000 in 2007—before rising again after the start of the ﬁnancial crisis
in 2008—ﬁlings peaked at 1.5 million in 2010. Similarly, foreclosures rose
quickly when the ﬁnancial crisis began. The increase in bankruptcies and
foreclosures reﬂects both the decline in debtors’ incomes due to widespread
job loss and the fall in housing prices that caused some homeowners to walk
away from their homes since their mortgages were underwater after housing
prices declined.
How might we predict that the ﬁnancial crisis affected the elderly relative
to the non-elderly? The elderly receive social security income that remained
unaffected by the ﬁnancial crisis, and they were also less likely to lose their
jobs because they were less likely to work in the ﬁrst place. This implies that
the elderly were harmed less by the ﬁnancial crisis, so the increase in
bankruptcy ﬁlings following the crisis would have been predicted to be less
for the elderly than the non-elderly. Similarly, elderly homeowners are less
likely to have mortgages and have less mortgage debt than homeowners in
general, meaning they were less likely to default on their mortgages after the
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ﬁnancial crisis, both because they were less likely to be ﬁnancially distressed,
and because their mortgages were less likely to be underwater after the
crisis.14
For these reasons, the 2005 bankruptcy reform is predicted to have
reduced bankruptcy ﬁlings and increased foreclosure starts for all age
groups, but the changes for the elderly would be predicted to be less than
for the non-elderly. Accordingly, we predict an increase in the proportion of
older bankruptcy ﬁlers after 2005, but a reduction in the proportion of
foreclosure starts affecting the elderly after 2005. The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis
would be anticipated to boost both bankruptcies and foreclosures for all age
groups, but by less for the elderly than other ages. Accordingly, our model
predicts a relative decline in the proportion of both bankruptcies and
foreclosures affecting the elderly after the ﬁnancial crisis. We test these
predictions in the next sections.

Summary Statistics and Difference-in-differences
We estimate separate models explaining bankruptcy ﬁlings and foreclosure
starts over the period of the 2005 bankruptcy reform and the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis, using the data discussed above. Because we use the near-elderly as our
comparison group for the elderly, we drop all observations of individuals
older than age 85 or younger than age 45.
Bankruptcy reform went into effect in the fourth quarter of 2005.15 For
the analysis of the effect of bankruptcy reform, we drop the two quarters
before and two quarters after the reform occurred (2005Q2 through
2006Q1), because there was a rush to ﬁle before the reform went into effect
and very few ﬁlings occurred just after the reform. We end the sample
period at the end of 2007 in order to avoid including the beginning of the
ﬁnancial crisis in the analysis of bankruptcy reform. Our time period for
the analysis of bankruptcy reform therefore covers seven quarters before the
reform, from 2003Q3 to 2005Q1, and seven quarters after, from 2006Q2
through 2007Q4. The number of observations in the sample explaining
bankruptcy ﬁlings before/after bankruptcy reform is 4.6 million, covering
338,000 distinct individuals. For the analysis explaining foreclosure starts
before/after bankruptcy reform, we restrict the sample to individuals who
have positive mortgage debt. This sample has 1.8 million observations
covering 160,000 distinct individuals.
Turning to the analysis of the ﬁnancial crisis, we date the crisis to the ﬁrst
quarter of 2008 and our sample period covers 2006Q3 through 2009Q4, or
six quarters before and eight quarters after the crisis. We start the sample
period at 2006Q3 to avoid including the period before bankruptcy reform.
Sample sizes are similar to those used to explain bankruptcy ﬁlings and
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TABLE .. Summary statistics
Bankruptcy reform sample

Financial crisis sample

Bankruptcy

Foreclosure
start

Bankruptcy

Foreclosure
start

0.0048(0.14)

0.0057(0.15)

0.0044(0.13)

0.011(0.21)

Foreclosure start 0.0068(0.16)
rate (annual)

0.0059(0.15)

0.0084(0.18)

0.0112(0.21)

Post

0.52(0.50)

0.528(0.499)

0.58(0.49)

0.58(0.49)

Fraction of
0.32(0.47)
individuals >= 65

0.186(0.389)

0.32(0.47)

0.20(0.40)

Age

59.9(11)

56.7(8.8)

60.1(11)

57.2(8.9)

Bankcard debt
($000)

3.9(8.0)

6.16(9.8)

3.8(7.8)

6.12(9.63)

Auto loan
($000)

2.15(5.7)

3.4(6.9)

2.0(4.9)

3.12(6.09)

Bankruptcy
ﬁling rate
(annual)

Mortgage ($000) 53(113)

128(148)

59.0(124)

141(160)

N

4.6 million

1.8 million

4.3 million

1.7 million

Time period

2003Q3–2005Q1,
2006Q2–2007Q4

2003Q3–2005Q1,
2006Q2–2007Q4

2006Q3–2009Q4 2006Q3–2009Q4

Note: Figures are means, with standard deviations in parentheses. The foreclosure start samples
include only individuals with positive mortgage debt.
Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.

foreclosure starts before/after bankruptcy reform. (Table 5.1 reports summary statistics for both samples.)
First we calculate simple difference-in-differences (D-D) reported in
Table 5.2. Here the top panel gives annual bankruptcy ﬁling rates before
versus after the 2005 bankruptcy reform for the elderly versus the nearelderly. The ﬁling rate for the elderly in the pre-reform period was 0.35
percent per year, while the ﬁling rate for the near-elderly was more than
twice as high at 0.84 percent per year. Thus the elderly ﬁled for bankruptcy
much less often than the near-elderly, presumably because they have less
debt. Filing rates fell sharply after bankruptcy reform for both groups, but
the drop was 0.19 percentage points for the elderly versus the much larger
ﬁgure of 0.50 percentage points for the near-elderly. Because the drop for
the elderly was smaller, the D-D is positive and large: 0.33 percentage points,
which is nearly as large as the pre-reform bankruptcy ﬁling rate of the
elderly. The fact that the D-D is positive accords with our prediction that
the 2005 bankruptcy reform caused the proportion of bankruptcy ﬁlings by
the elderly to increase.
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In the bottom panel of Table 5.2, we offer the same calculations for
foreclosure rates before versus after the 2005 bankruptcy reform. The
foreclosure rate for the elderly rose slightly from 0.42 percent per year
before the reform to 0.48 percent after, but the foreclosure rate for the
near-elderly rose more, from 0.54 percent to 0.68 percent. Because the absolute increase for the elderly was smaller than for the near-elderly, the D-D is
negative, or –0.08 percentage points. The negative result is again consistent
with our prediction and it implies that bankruptcy reform caused the proportion of foreclosure starts affecting the elderly to fall.
Next we turn to the ﬁnancial crisis. The top panel of Table 5.3 shows the
same information for bankruptcy ﬁling rates before versus after the ﬁnancial
crisis. Bankruptcy rates increased sharply for both groups following the
crisis: the increase for the elderly was from 0.18 percent per year before
the crisis to 0.26 percent after, or by 0.08 percentage points; while the
increase for the near-elderly was from 0.38 percent per year to 0.66 percent,
or by 0.28 percentage points. In percentage terms, these increases are 48
percent for the elderly versus 75 percent for the near-elderly. Because the
absolute increase for the elderly was smaller, the D-D is negative, or –0.20
percentage points. This result supports our prediction that the ﬁnancial
crisis caused the proportion of bankruptcy ﬁlings by the elderly to fall,
because their bankruptcy ﬁling rate increased by less than that of the
near-elderly.
The bottom panel of Table 5.3 shows the change in foreclosure rates
before versus after the ﬁnancial crisis. Foreclosure rates of the elderly
increased from 0.48 percent per year before the crisis to 0.83 percent
TABLE .. Annual bankruptcy ﬁling and foreclosure rates for the elderly versus the
near-elderly, before and after the 2005 bankruptcy reform (2003Q3–2005Q1,
2006Q2–2007Q4)
Bankruptcy ﬁling rates:
Before reform

After reform

Difference

Elderly (65–85)

0.0035

0.0016

–0.0019 (–54%)

Near-elderly (45–64)

0.0084

0.0035

–0.0050 (–59%)
0.0031

Difference-in-difference

Foreclosure rates:
Before reform

After reform

Difference
0.0007 (17%)

Elderly (65–85)

0.0041

0.0048

Near-elderly (45–64)

0.0054

0.0069

Difference-in-difference
Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.

0.0014 (26%)
–0.00076
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TABLE .. Annual bankruptcy ﬁling rates and foreclosure rates for the elderly versus
the near-elderly, before and after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis (2006Q3–2009Q4)
Bankruptcy ﬁling rates:
Before crisis

After crisis

Difference

Elderly (65–85)

0.0018

0.0026

0.0008 (48%)

Near-elderly (45–64)

0.0038

0.0066

0.0028 (74%)
–0.0020

Difference-in-difference

Foreclosure rates:
Before crisis

After crisis

Difference

Elderly (65–85)

0.0048

0.0083

0.0035 (74%)

Near-elderly (45–64)

0.0076

0.016

Difference-in-difference

0.0083 (108%)
–0.0047

Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.

afterwards, or by 0.35 percentage points, while the foreclosure rates of the
near-elderly increased sharply from 0.76 percent per year before the crisis to
1.6 percent after, or by 0.82 percentage points. Because the increase for the
elderly was smaller, the D-D is –0.47 percentage points. This result again
supports our prediction that the ﬁnancial crisis had less negative effects on
the elderly than the near-elderly, resulting in a fall in the proportion of
foreclosures affecting the elderly. Note that both of the D-D terms for the
ﬁnancial crisis are large in absolute terms—they are as large as the pre-crisis
absolute bankruptcy and foreclosure rates for the elderly.
The large size of the difference terms suggests that bankruptcy reform
and the ﬁnancial crisis had large negative effects on both the elderly and the
near-elderly. Nevertheless, the D-D terms suggest that these negative effects
were smaller for the elderly than the near-elderly.

Regression Speciﬁcation and Results
Next we run Probit regressions that repeat the calculations, but we now add
other controls. The speciﬁcation is a D-D regression, where we deﬁne Y_it
as a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i ﬁles for bankruptcy in quarter
t and 0 otherwise. Moreover, Post_t is equal to 1 in the period after bankruptcy reform and zero before; Elderly_i is equal to 1 for the elderly and 0 for
the near-elderly; and Z_it is a vector of control variables. The controls consist
of individual i’s bank card debt, auto loan debt, and mortgage debt, all
lagged one quarter and deﬂated to 2004 dollars, and dummies for individual
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i’s Risk Score in categories, with the lowest score category omitted. We also
include ﬁxed effects for individuals’ age in years and for state of residence.
ε_it is the error term. We estimate the following model:
Y it ¼ a þ bðPost tÞ þ cðElderly i*Post tÞ þ dðZ itÞ þ ε it
The D-D term is c. Errors are clustered by individual.16 The sample and time
period are the same as discussed above for the raw D-D calculations. We use
Probit for this and all regressions.
Additionally, we run a regression explaining foreclosure starts before
versus after the 2005 bankruptcy reform. The speciﬁcation is the same as
above, except that now Y_it is redeﬁned to be a dummy equal to 1 if
foreclosure started for individual i in quarter t and zero otherwise. The
time period and sample are the same as discussed above for the raw D-D
calculations in Table 5.2, lower panel.
We use the same speciﬁcation for regressions analyzing the effect of the
2008 ﬁnancial crisis. Here Y_it is either a dummy for whether individual i
ﬁled for bankruptcy in quarter t or a dummy for whether foreclosure started
for individual i in quarter t and Post_t is a dummy for the period after the
ﬁnancial crisis. The time period and samples are the same as for the raw D-D
calculations in Table 5.3.
Table 5.4 shows the results of the regressions explaining bankruptcy
ﬁlings and foreclosure starts for the bankruptcy reform sample, and p-values
are in parentheses. In column (1) explaining bankruptcy ﬁlings, the Post
variable is negative and signiﬁcant, reﬂecting the fact that bankruptcy ﬁlings
by both the elderly and the near-elderly dropped after the reform. The D-D
term is positive as predicted and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level (p =.075). Yet both variables are extremely small: they suggest that
ﬁlings by the elderly dropped by 0.05 percentage points, while ﬁlings by the
near-elderly dropped by 0.06 percentage points. These results suggest that
much of the effect of bankruptcy reform seen in Table 5.2 is accounted for
by individual characteristics, rather than by the reform.
The bankcard and auto debt variables have the predicted positive signs
and are highly signiﬁcant, but mortgage debt is negatively rather than
positively related to the probability of bankruptcy—probably because only
homeowners have mortgages and homeowners are less likely to ﬁle for
bankruptcy than renters.
The second column of Table 5.4 shows the results of the regression
explaining the effect of bankruptcy reform on the number of foreclosure
starts. Here, the Post variable is positive as predicted, but it is even smaller
than in the regression explaining bankruptcy ﬁlings. The D-D coefﬁcient
has a positive rather than the predicted negative sign, but it is extremely
small and insigniﬁcant. As a result, we conclude that bankruptcy reform
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TABLE .. Results of Probit regressions explaining annual bankruptcy ﬁlings and
foreclosure starts, before and after the 2005 bankruptcy reform (ﬁgures are marginal
effects, with p values in parentheses)
Bankruptcy ﬁlings
(1)

Foreclosure starts
(2)

–0.00061
(0.000)

2.7e-6
(0.000)

Elderly*post-reform

0.00011
(0.075)

9.7e-7
(0.94)

Lagged bankcard debt ($000)

4.5e-5
(0.000)

–2.4e-6
(0.000)

Lagged auto loan ($000)

3.8e-6
(0.000)

–5.7e-7
(0.20)

Lagged mortgage debt ($000)

–3.7e-8
(0.70)

4.4e-7
(0.000)

Risk categories

X

X

Age ﬁxed effects

X

X

State ﬁxed effects

X

X

4.2 million

1.7 million

1999Q1–2005Q2,
2006Q2–2007Q4

1999Q1–2005Q2,
2006Q2–2007Q4

Post-reform

N
Time period

Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.

raised foreclosure start rates for both the elderly and the near-elderly, but
the effects were extremely small and did not differ signiﬁcantly between the
two groups.
We turn now to the results of the ﬁnancial crisis regressions, shown in
Table 5.5. Column 1 shows the results of the regression explaining bankruptcy ﬁlings. The Post coefﬁcient has the predicted positive sign, the D-D
term has the predicted negative sign, and both are at least marginally
signiﬁcant but they are extremely small. Similarly, column 2 explaining
foreclosure starts has a Post coefﬁcient with the predicted positive sign and
the D-D term is negative, but the latter is insigniﬁcant and both are
extremely small.
One possible explanation for the small size of the D-D coefﬁcients in
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 is that events such as bankruptcy reform or the ﬁnancial
crisis may cause ﬁnancial distress that becomes worse over time as debt
gradually builds up, but may only lead to bankruptcy or foreclosure after
several years. Thus our time periods might be too short to capture the full
effects of bankruptcy reform or the ﬁnancial crisis, leading to small and/or
insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients for the Post and Elderly*Post terms.
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TABLE .. Results of Probit regressions explaining annual bankruptcy ﬁlings and
foreclosure starts, before and after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis (2006Q3–2009Q4)
Bankruptcy ﬁlings
(1)

Foreclosure starts
(2)

Post-crisis

2.9e-4
(0.000)

1.4e-04
(0.000)

Elderly*post-crisis

–8.9e-5
(0.094)

–2.2e-5
(0.35)

Lagged bankcard debt ($000)

4.6e-5
(0.000)

–4.1e-6
(0.000)

Lagged auto loan ($000)

6.8e-6
(0.000)

–1.8e-6
(0.018)

Lagged mortgage debt ($000)

4.8e-7
(0.000)

1.2e-6
(0.000)

Risk categories

X

X

Age ﬁxed effects

X

X

State ﬁxed effects

X

X

N
Time period

3.9 million

1.7 million

2006Q3–2009Q4

2006Q3–2009Q4

Note: Figures are marginal effects, with p values in parentheses.
Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.

To test this possibility, we reran our models using a much longer time
period extending from 2000Q1 to 2012Q4. To capture the effect of bankruptcy reform, we use an interaction term between being elderly and the
period after bankruptcy reform, Elderly_i*Post-Reform_t; to capture the
effect of the ﬁnancial crisis, we use a separate interaction between being
elderly and the post-ﬁnancial crisis period, Elderly_i*Post-Crisis_t. We also
drop the Post_t variable and introduce quarterly ﬁxed effects. We again drop
the period around bankruptcy reform from 2005Q3 to 2006Q1, but otherwise the speciﬁcation remains the same. We predict that if the effects of
bankruptcy reform and/or the ﬁnancial crisis grew worse over a multi-year
period before leading to bankruptcy or foreclosure, then the coefﬁcients of
the interaction terms will be larger and more signiﬁcant than in the shorter
period regressions.
Results are shown in Table 5.6. Surprisingly, all of the interaction terms
remain approximately the same magnitude. For example, the Elderly*PostReform coefﬁcient in the regression explaining bankruptcy ﬁlings was
0.00011 in Table 5.4 and 0.00014 in Table 5.6, while the Elderly*Post-Crisis
coefﬁcient in the regression explaining foreclosure starts was –0.000022
in Table 5.5 compared to –0.000024 in Table 5.6; neither was signiﬁcant.
In other words, for the longer period regressions, the result is again that
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TABLE .. Results of Probit regressions explaining annual bankruptcy ﬁlings and
foreclosure starts, 2000–12
Bankruptcy ﬁlings
(1)

Foreclosure starts
(2)

Elderly*post-reform

0.00014
(0.049)

–2.6e-5
(0.31)

Elderly*post-crisis

–0.00015
(0.019)

–2.4e-5
(0.31)

Lagged bankcard debt ($000)

6.1e-5
(0.000)

–6.0e-5
(0.000)

Lagged auto loan ($000)

6.2e-6
(0.000)

–4.0e-6
(0.000)

Lagged mortgage debt ($000)

8.0e-7
(0.000)

1.3e-6
(0.000)

Age ﬁxed effects

X

X

State ﬁxed effects

X

X

Quarter ﬁxed effects

X

X

N

13.2 million

5.4 million

Time period

2000Q1–2005Q2,
2006Q2–2012Q4

2000Q1–2005Q2,
2006Q2–2012Q4

Note: Figures are marginal effects, with p values in parentheses.
Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.

there was little difference between how the elderly versus the near-elderly
responded to the 2005 bankruptcy reform or the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
Another possible explanation for the small size of the difference and D-D
terms in the regressions is that individual debt and risk characteristics
variables could indirectly capture the effects of bankruptcy reform or the
ﬁnancial crisis. Suppose that some individuals became ﬁnancially distressed
following the ﬁnancial crisis due to job loss. As a result, their debt levels rose
and their risk scores fell. Since our debt variables are lagged only one
quarter and our risk score categories reﬂect conditions only a month or
two earlier, these variables change in response to the ﬁnancial crisis and may
therefore be correlated with our Post and Post*Elderly variables, partially
capturing the effect of the ﬁnancial crisis. If so, then the size and signiﬁcance of our estimated Post and Post*Elderly coefﬁcients will fall. The same
could be the case in our analysis of bankruptcy reform. In other words, while
our raw difference and D-D results may be overestimates of the effects of
bankruptcy reform and the ﬁnancial crisis, our estimated difference and
D-D results may be underestimates of the same effects.
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Conclusions
Our analysis suggests that both the 2005 bankruptcy reform and the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis had large effects on the number of bankruptcy ﬁlings and
foreclosure starts, both of which are important indicators of ﬁnancial distress. The 2005 bankruptcy reform caused the number of bankruptcy ﬁlings
to fall sharply and the number of foreclosures to rise, implying that fewer
debtors used bankruptcy to obtain relief from ﬁnancial distress and that
bankruptcy declined as a mechanism to help homeowners avoid foreclosure. The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis caused the number of bankruptcy ﬁlings and
the number of foreclosure starts to rise, implying a general increase in
ﬁnancial distress. Nevertheless, our economic analysis implies that the elderly were less negatively affected by both the reform and the ﬁnancial crisis
than younger age groups.
The data support these predictions: following bankruptcy reform, the
decline in elderly bankruptcy ﬁlings was smaller than for the near-elderly,
but bankruptcy ﬁlings by both groups increased. Also in line with predictions, the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis caused a smaller increase in bankruptcy ﬁlings
by the elderly than the near-elderly, so that the proportion of ﬁlings by the
elderly fell. Both bankruptcy reform and the ﬁnancial crisis also caused an
increase in the number of foreclosure starts by both groups, but the increase
for the elderly was smaller. This means that the proportion of foreclosure
starts affecting the elderly fell after both bankruptcy reform and the ﬁnancial crisis. Our results suggest that, while both bankruptcy reform and the
ﬁnancial crisis made debtors signiﬁcantly worse off, the impact on the
elderly was smaller than on younger individuals. Therefore neither bankruptcy reform nor the ﬁnancial crisis can explain the rise in ﬁnancial distress
of the elderly relative to younger age groups.
Nevertheless, the regression results highlight some additional nuances. In
particularly, they suggest that the overall effects of bankruptcy reform and the
ﬁnancial crisis were not particularly negative for either group, and they did not
alter outcomes for the elderly versus near-elderly. Speciﬁcally, the regression
analysis corrects for individual debt characteristics which themselves were negatively affected by bankruptcy reform and the ﬁnancial crisis. In any event, we
conclude that bankruptcy reform and the ﬁnancial crisis cannot explain the
increasing ﬁnancial distress of the elderly relative to younger age groups.

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this chapter are the authors’ and do not represent
the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve
System.
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Notes
1. Our data are from the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data (CCP). See
the next section for discussion.
2. The proportion of the population age 65–85 as a share of the population age
20–85 rose from 17.3 percent in 2000 to 20.6 percent in 2018.
3. These ﬁgures reﬂect the number of foreclosure starts affecting elderly homeowners as a proportion of all foreclosure starts. Note that not all foreclosure
starts become completed foreclosures, because homeowners may stop foreclosure by paying off their mortgage arrears, agreeing to a repayment plan with the
lender, or making an agreement with the lender to walk away from the
property—a short sale.
4. The reform was the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 (Pub.L. 109–8, 119 Stat. 23, enacted April 20, 2005).
5. The CCP excludes individuals who do not have social security numbers and those
who have no credit history, because they never applied for or qualiﬁed for a loan or
a credit card. But individuals are covered for 10 years if they applied for a loan or
credit card in the past. See Lee and van der Klaauw (2010) for discussion.
6. Payday loans are not covered because payday lenders do not report information
to Equifax. Because payday lenders are excluded individuals who have only
payday loans are excluded from the sample unless they have another type of
loan or had one in the past.
7. Bankruptcy ﬁlings include ﬁlings under both Chapters 7 and 13.
8. The CCP underrepresents 20–24 year olds, in part because legislation prevents
credit bureaus from setting up ﬁles for college-age students and also because many
young people do not have credit. In the CCP, the share of 20–24 year olds declined
from 8 percent to 6.7 percent between 2000 to 2018, while the share of this group
in the population remained at around 9.5 percent over the same period.
9. See White (1998) for calculations showing that up to one-third of US households
could have beneﬁtted ﬁnancially from ﬁling for bankruptcy under the pre-2005
bankruptcy law.
10. For discussion of how bankruptcy helps homeowners, see White and Zhu (2010)
and Li et al. (2019). For general discussion of bankruptcy law and the 2005
bankruptcy reform, see White (2011).
11. Since the 2005 bankruptcy reform, bankruptcy ﬁlings have peaked in March of
each year, suggesting that many ﬁlers are deterred by the high costs of ﬁling and
delay until they receive their tax refunds; see US Courts (2018).
12. Federal government student loans became non-dischargeable except in cases of
‘undue hardship’ in 1997 and the 2005 bankruptcy reform also made private
educational loans non-dischargeable.
13. For discussion of foreclosure, incentives for mortgage default, and the effect of
the ﬁnancial crisis, see Gerardi et al. (2007), Mayer et al. (2009), Elul et al.
(2010), Jiang et al. (2014), and Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011).
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14. We have argued elsewhere that the 2005 bankruptcy reform caused the ﬁnancial
crisis in part, by making bankruptcy less favorable to debtors and therefore
causing mortgage defaults to rise even before the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis
(Li et al. 2011).
15. The reform went into effect in October 2005.
16. Standard errors remain virtually the same if we instead cluster the errors by
zipcode.
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